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DOES A CLAIM EXIST FOR DECEDENTS' PRE-
DEATH PAIN AND SUFFERING IN ACTIONS
ARISING OUT OF AVIATION DISASTERS
GOVERNED BY THE WARSAW CONVENTION
AND THE DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT?:
THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a flight departing from Miami, bound for Paris.1 En route, the
airplane experiences mechanical difficulties and crashes into the Atlantic
Ocean. Only one passenger survives the impact He sustains serious injuries
that after several months of hospitalization cause his death.
Upon his death, both his dependents and his estate hire an attorney to file
claims against the airline. In response, the airline files a motion to dismiss,
asserting that there is no basis for the survivorship action. After days of
research to determine whether the motion has merit, the attorney concludes
that there is no simple answer.
The Warsaw Convention2 governs all actions involving international air
travel. Because the crash occurred over international waters, these claims are
also governed by the Death on the High Seas Act ("DOHSA").3
It is well-established that DOHSA allows the decedent's dependents to
recover in claims for wrongful death in actions arising under the Warsaw
Convention.4 However, there is much debate as to whether a survival action,
initiated by and on behalf of the decedent's estate, is sustainable in DOHSA
actions arising under the Warsaw Convention.5 If survival actions are
permitted, the decedent's estate may recover for any pain and suffering the
decedent experienced before dying. If DOHSA preempts survival actions,
pre-death pain and suffering damages are not recoverable.
Currently, there is a split among the circuits regarding whether
survivorship actions exist under DOHSA.6 Some courts hold that DOHSA
1. Dateline NBC (NBC television broadcast, Oct 13, 1996).
2. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation By
Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. app.
40105 (1994) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
3. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-68 (1994).
4. See infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 42-43, 53-54 and accompanying text.
6. For a discussion on the Supreme Court's refusal to resolve this split, see infra note 52 and
accompanying text.
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only expressly sanctions wrongful death actions, thereby preempting all other
sources of recovery including survival actions. Other courts conclude that
DOHSA does not preempt survival actions because its scope is limited to
wrongful death claims.8 Therefore, survival actions under state or general
maritime law are permitted along with wrongful death claims under
DOHSA.9
This Note will address the issue of whether, in actions arising out of air
disasters on the high seas, DOHSA completely preempts all other bases of
recovery, or whether it may be supplemented with survival actions under
either state or general maritime law. Specifically, it will discuss the
recoverability of damages for decedents' pre-death pain and suffering in
actions to which DOHSA is applicable. Part I will consist of a discussion of
the Warsaw Convention and DOHSA. This section will also discuss courts'
interpretation of the interplay between the two Acts. Part II will provide an
overall history of the issue presented, and will highlight the various decisions
providing the basis for opposing points of view. Part III will address the
arguments in support of, and in opposition to supplementing DOHSA with
survival actions. Part IV will summarize recent lower federal court decisions
on this issue. Part V will conclude that, under current law, DOHSA preempts
all other statutory and common-law sources of recovery; thus it may not be
supplemented with survival actions under state or general maritime law. Yet
this result is grossly unfair to litigants in aviation disaster cases. Therefore
Part V proposes that Congress should modify DOHSA or enact new
legislation, applicable solely to claims under the Warsaw Convention, to
permit litigants to initiate both wrongful death and survivorship claims.
I
In Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co.,10 the Supreme Court concluded
that actions arising out of international aviation disasters on the high seas are
governed by both the Warsaw Convention and DOHSA." The Court held
that the Warsaw Convention permits claims for "damages sustained" in an
international aviation disaster,1 2 while DOHSA provides for the recovery of
7. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 42-43, 54 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 42-43, 54 and accompanying text.
10. 116 S. Ct. 629, 632-34 (1996). This case, along with all others discussed herein in which
Korean Air Lines is a named party, involves the crash of Korean Air Lines flight 007 on September 1,
1983 over the Sea of Japan. Id. All 269 persons aboard were killed. Id. at 631.
11. Id. at 636.
12. d In Zicherman, the Supreme Court interpreted "dommage sustained," within Article 17 of
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damages where there has been a death on the high seas. 13 However, the
Supreme Court has yet to decide whether DOHSA preempts survivorship
actions, or whether such claims may be initiated, along with wrongful death
claims, under state or general maritime law.
14
A. Death on the High Seas Act
In The Harrisburg, the Supreme Court concluded that general maritime
law does not provide the basis for wrongful death actions.' 5 In response to
this preclusive ruling, Congress enacted DOHSA in 1920.16 Modeled after
Lord Campbell's Act,' 7 DOHSA was intended to provide a wrongful death
cause of action to beneficiaries of those individuals killed on the high seas as
a result of neglect or wrongful act'18 DOHSA specifically provided that such
the Warsaw Convention, to mean "legally cognizable harm." Id. at 632-33. For a discussion of what
constitutes such harm, see infra note 27.
13. 46 U.S.C. app. § 761 (1994).
14. In Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 43 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1994), the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals awarded damages for pre-death pain and suffering because plaintiff presented evidence
from which it could be "'inferred that passenger[s] underwent some suffering before impact."' Id. at
23 (quoting Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 1984)). The recovery
was available through a survivorship action under federal maritime law. Id. In its petition for certiorari
to the Supreme Court, Korean Air Lines failed to challenge this award for pre-death pain and
suffering. Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 631 n.1. Therefore, the Supreme Court expressly declined to
review the recoverability of such damages. Id. Furthermore, the Court recently denied certiorari in two
lower court decisions on this issue. See infra note 52. It is interesting to note that some lower federal
courts have allowed victims' beneficiaries to recover damages for pre-death pain and suffering, in part,
because the attorney for Korean Air Lines failed to challenge this award before the Supreme Court
See Beim v. Korean Air Lines Co., No. 83-4624, slip. op. at 20 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1996); Speir v.
Korean Air Lines Co., No. 83-4626, slip. op. at 20 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1996). See infra note 107.
15. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886). This case involved a suit for wrongful death arising out
of a collision between a steamer and a schooner in a Massachusetts sound. The Court denied plaintiffs
recovery on grounds that no action for wrongful death could be maintained under general maritime law
in the absence of a federal statute providing for such a right. Id. at 213. Furthermore, the Court, in
reaching its decision, relied on the commonly-held belief that the cause of action died with the victim,
and therefore could not be sustained post-mortem. Id; see also Ugo Colella, The Proper Role of
Special Solicitude in the General Maritime Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 227, 246 (1995).
16. After The Harrisburg, Congress tried unsuccessfully to enact federal legislation sanctioning
wrongful death actions in navigable water. See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207,
235 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing legislative history of DOHSA).
An early version of DOHSA, originally proposed in 1917, created a federal cause of action for
wrongful death occurring on the high seas. Id. at 235-36. It was to operate concurrently with state
statutes providing the basis for wrongful death claims in actions arising out of territorial waters. Id.
This bill was never enacted, however, due to the inception of World War I. Id. Finally, in 1920, the
present version of DOHSA was brought before Congress. Id.
17. 59 CONG. Rac. 4482 (1920). Lord Campbell's Act was the first of a number of statutes
enacted in numerous European nations that served as a "More humane and enlightened policy
[allowing] dependent parties to recover in case of death of their near relatives upon the high seas." Id.
18. Section 761 provides:
[W]henever the death of a person be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default occurring on the
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beneficiaries may recover for pecuniary losses sustained.' 9
B. Warsaw Convention
In 1934, the United States became a signatory member of the Warsaw
Convention.20 The Warsaw Convention was designed to govern all actions
arising out of international air travel.2 ' The purposes behind the Warsaw
Convention were two-fold: to create uniform legal principles governing
international air travel and to limit international air carrier's liability.22 In
Benjamin v. British European Airways,23 the Second Circuit held that Article
17 creates a cause of action under the Warsaw Convention.24
high seas beyond a maritime league away from shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or
the Territories or dependencies of the United States, the personal representative of the decedent
may maintain a suit for damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the
exclusive benefit of decedent's wife, husband, parent, child or dependent relative against the
vessel, person, or corporation which would have been liable if the death had not ensued.
46 U.S.C. app. § 761 (1994). The Supreme Court has held that this section preempts state law
wrongful death claims in actions arising out of deaths on the high seas. See Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 231-
32. Prior to the Court's decision in Tallentire, however, some lower courts believed that DOHSA did
not preempt wrongful death causes of action under state law. Id. at 210-11. Courts relied on section
767 ofDOHSA, which states in part that "the provisions of any State statute giving or regulating rights
of action or remedies for death shall not be affected by this chapter." 46 U.S.C. app. § 767 (1988).
However, the Supreme Court determined that this is merely a 'jurisdictional savings clause," granting
state courts concurrent jurisdiction to hear DOHSA actions for wrongful death. See Tallentire, 477
U.S. at 232. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that DOHSA preempts all other actions for wrongful
death on the high seas. Id. However, this conclusion is restricted to wrongful death actions. It does not
address whether DOHSA preempts survival claims under state or general maritime law. For a
discussion of the definition of wrongful death actions, see infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
19. Section 762 states that:
[t]he r covery in such suit shall be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by
the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought and shall be apportioned among them by the court
in proportion to the loss they may have severally suffered by reason of the death of the person by
whose representative the suit is brought.
46 U.S.C. app. § 762 (1994). For further discussion of pecuniary loss, see infra note 40.
20. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2.
21. William C. Brown, III, Problems Arising From the Intersection of Traditional Maritime Law
and Aviation Death and Personal Injury Liability, 68 TUL. L. REV. 577, 591 (1994).
22. Id at 591; see also Luis F. Ras, Warsaw's Wingspan Over State Laws: Towards a
Streamlined System of Recovery, 59 J. AIR L. & COM. 587 (1994); James M. Grippando, Warsaw
Convention-Federal Jurisdiction and Air Carrier Liability for Mental Injury: A Matter of Limits, 19
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 59 (1985); Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The
United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497,498-99 (1967).
23. 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978).
24. Id. at 916-18; see also Steven R. Pounian & Blanca Rodriquez, Recent Developments in
Aviation Law, 31 TORT & INS. L. J. 149, 150 n.4 (1996); St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Venezuelan Int'l Airways,
Inc., 807 F.2d 1543 (lth Cir. 1987); Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., 737 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1984); In re Mexico City Aircrash, 708 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1983).
Article 17 provides that:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of the
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C. Interplay Between DOHSA and Warsaw Convention
In the past, courts have struggled to determine whether DOHSA and the
Warsaw Convention should be applied concurrently to actions arising out of
international aviation disasters on the high seas.25 However, in Zicherman,
the Supreme Court resolved this conflict by creating a framework for cases
governed by both DOHSA and Warsaw Convention.2 6 The Court concluded
that where an incident has occurred involving international air travel, the
Warsaw Convention creates the right to bring an action.27 However, the
Warsaw Convention does not determine the nature of those actions that may
be initiated.28 Instead, it mandates that "such matters [be relegated] to the
laws of the nation in which the action is filed."29
In the United States, there is no specific legislation dictating the types of
passenger, or any other bodily injury suffered by the passenger, if the accident which caused the
damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, at art. 17.
25. Previously, some courts held that any inconsistencies between the Warsaw Convention and
DOHSA should be resolved in favor of the Warsaw Convention. They reason that Congress enacted
DOHSA before signing the Warsaw Convention. According to the Restatement of the Law of Foreign
Relations of the United States § 135, "[w]hen [treaties] conflict, the subsequent one controls." (cited in
In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 814 F. Supp. 599, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)). See also In re Korean Air
Lines Disaster, 807 F. Supp. 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (in actions in which Warsaw Convention and
DOHSA conflict, the former prevails); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Honolulu, Hawaii, 783 F. Supp.
1261, 1265 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (the court determined that the Convention preempts "local laws" if there
is a conflict between the two).
26. Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, 116 S. Ct. 629, 636 (1996).
27. Id. Specifically, the Supreme Court determined that the action was sustainable under Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention. The Court based its conclusion on the presence of the word "dommage"
in Article 17, which the Court interpreted as referring to "legally cognizable harm." Id. at 633. Under
this interpretation, the text of Article 17 provides the basis for a cause of action, but does not
determine exactly what harm is deemed "cognizable." Id.
28. In Zicherman the Supreme Court concluded that the "law of the (Warsaw] Convention does
not affect the substantive questions of who may bring suit and what they may be compensated for.
Those questions are to be answered by the domestic law selected by the courts of the contracting
states." Id. at 634. Despite this language, some courts still insist that the Warsaw Convention itself
affords a basis for survival and wrongful death actions. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near
Honolulu, Hawaii, 783 F. Supp. at 1263 (concluding that the Warsaw Convention was written in the
context of civil law which, unlike common law, does not make the distinction between wrongful death
and survival actions; therefore, even without specific language providing for survival remedies, such
are recoverable because they are implicit in the language of the Convention); see also Beir v. Korean
Air Lines Co., No. 83-4624 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1996); Yun v. Korean Air Lines Co., 798 F. Supp. 755
(E.D.N.Y. 1992). While these holdings have not been expressly overturned, it is unlikely, in light of
Zicherman, that damages will be recoverable under any source other than the domestic law of the
nation in which the action is filed. For a discussion of this issue, see Jimmy Wilkins, Comment,
Application ofAdmirally Jurisdiction to Aviation Disasters on the High Seas, 20 TUL. MAR. L. J. 465,
484-85 (1996).
29. Beirn, No. 83-4624, slip. op. at 3.
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sustainable actions under the Warsaw Convention. Therefore, courts must
apply the "law that would govern in absence of the Warsaw Convention." 30
The Supreme Court has recognized that, where aviation disasters occur on
the high seas, DOHSA governs wrongful death claims.3' Yet the Zicherman
Court failed to address whether DOHSA applies to, and therefore preempts,
survivorship claims arising out of deaths on the high seas.32
II. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT
Prior to 1970, the question of whether DOHSA is the exclusive basis of
recovery for deaths on the high seas had never been brought before the
Supreme Court 33 In 1970, however, the Court considered this issue in
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.34 This case involved a wrongful death
action for unseaworthiness brought by the widow of a longshoreman killed in
territorial waters. 35 States Marine argued that the action should be dismissed
on grounds that DOHSA is inapplicable to wrongful death actions for deaths
occurring in territorial waters.3 Rather, States Marine asserted that DOHSA
expressly limits recovery to actions arising out of wrongful death on the high
seas.37 The Court disagreed, holding that although DOHSA does not
30. Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 636.
31. Id. Furthermore, DOHSA preempts all other wrongful death claims for deaths on the high
seas. See supra note 18.
32. Seeinfranote52.
33. Before, 1970, however, several lower courts addressed the issue of DOHSA's exclusivity, a
number of which freely allowed DOHSA to be supplemented with survival actions under state law.
See Joseph F. Smith, Jr., A Maritime Survival Remedy: Is There Life After Higginbotham?, 6 MAR.
LAW. 185, 187 (1981) (citing to Canillas v. Joseph H. Carter, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 48, 51 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Saffir v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 241 F. Supp. 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1965);
Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Bums v. Marine
Transp. Lines, 207 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. The S.S. Washington, 172 F. Supp.
905, 908 (E.D. Va.), afjd sub nom. United States v. Texas Co., 272 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1959); Carli V.
New London Flying Serv., Inc., 1965 A.M.C. 1644, 1646-47 (D. Conn. 1962); Abbott v. United States,
207 F. Supp. 468, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); In re Gulf Oil Corp., 172 F. Supp. 911, 915-17 (S.D.N.Y.
1959)).
34. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
35. Id. at 376.
36. Id.
37. Id In The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886), the Supreme Court held that no wrongful death
action exists under general maritime law for deaths at sea. In response, many states enacted legislation
which allowed beneficiaries to recover for wrongful death occurring in territorial waters. Soon
thereafter, Congress enacted DOHSA, which created a statutory wrongful death remedy for death on
the high seas. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 397-98. Despite the enactment of DOHSA, persons who initiated
actions for wrongful death in territorial waters were still governed by state laws, not DOHSA. Id. at
398-99. Moreover, those whose actions were governed by state law recovered primarily under
negligence claims, whereas plaintiffs governed by DOHSA recovered under actions for
unseaworthiness. Id. Initially, this distinction was irrelevant given that recovery was essentially
uniform. Id. Yet the distinction still precluded plaintiffs wishing to recover for wrongful death in
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specifically provide a wrongful death remedy for deaths occurring in
territorial waters, "no intention appears that the Act have the effect of
foreclosing any nonstatutory federal remedies that might be found
appropriate to effectuate the policies of general maritime law."38 As a result,
the Supreme Court determined that the absence of any Congressional intent
to prohibit wrongful death actions under general maritime law implies that
such actions are judicially recognizable. 39 Therefore, this decision formally
established a general maritime wrongful death action in non-DOHSA claims
by which plaintiff could recover.40
Subsequently, lower federal courts expanded the Supreme Court's
decision in Moragne4' and permitted the joinder of claims under DOHSA
with survival actions under state or general maritime law.42 These courts
determined that while DOHSA itself does not afford the basis for survival
actions, the Supreme Courts' reasoning in Moragne does permit these
additional claims.43 The practice of supplementing DOHSA occurred without
territorial waters from initiating unseaworthiness claims because such were not sanctioned under state
law, and DOHSA was inapplicable. For example, in Moragne, States Marine argued that because
Florida law did not permit unseaworthiness actions, plaintiffs claim should be dismissed. Id. at 376.
38. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 400. The Court concluded that Congress did not extend DOHSA's
coverage to actions for wrongful death in territorial waters because at the time, the remedies afforded
by state law were adequate. Id. Eventually, however, the unseaworthiness doctrine became the
"principal vehicle for recovery . . . overshadowing the negligence action." Id. at 399. Therefore,
DOHSA's adoption of general maritime's unseaworthiness doctrine rendered it a more superior
remedial basis than state law. Id. The Court concluded that Congress could not have foreseen the
disparity between recovery under DOHSA and under state law. Id. at 401-02.
In enacting DOHSA, Congress chose not to address actions arising out of territorial waters merely
because state law provided for seemingly ample recovery for such claims. Congress' failure to extend
DOHSA's coverage to territorial waters does not require that parties seeking to recover for deaths
caused by unseaworthiness must go without compensation. Rather, such plaintiffs may recover for
unseaworthiness under general maritime law. Id. at 399. Therefore, in Moragne, plaintiff was able to
maintain his unseaworthiness claim. Id.
39. Id. at 393.
40. Id. at 402. After Moragne, the Supreme Court, in Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S.
573 (1974), defined the types of recoverable damages in actions for wrongful death in territorial waters
under general maritime law. The Court determined that recoverable damages included: loss of support,
loss of society, loss of services, and funeral expenses. Id. at 584.
41. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1974); Spiller v. Thomas M. Lowe, Jr.
& Assocs., Inc., 466 F.2d 903, 909 (8th Cir. 1972); Greene v. Vantage Steamship Corp., 466 F.2d 159
(4th Cir. 1972); Dennis v. Central Gulf Steamship Corp., 453 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Dugas v. Nat'l
Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1386 (3d Cir. 1971).
43. For example, in Dennis, the Fifth Circuit permitted DOHSA to be supplemented with a
survival action under state law, thus enabling plaintiff to recover for decedent's pre-death pain and
suffering. 453 F.2d at 140. In addition, the Fifth Circuit recognized that general maritime law allows
recovery for pain and suffering. Id. Therefore, by allowing parties to recover such damages under
supplemental general maritime actions, the court merely removed "a bar to access to the existing
general maritime law." Id. at 141 (citing Moragne, 398 U.S. at 405-06). Additionally, in Spiller, the
Eighth Circuit allowed DOHSA to be supplemented based on its view that "the thrust of Moragne is
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controversy for several years, until the Supreme Court revisited the issue in
Mobile Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham.
44
In Higginbotham, the Supreme Court considered whether parties,
employing the Moragne rationale,45 could supplement claims for wrongful
death under DOHSA with claims for wrongful death under state or general
maritime law, and thereby recover for non-pecuniary losses.46 The Court held
that, under DOHSA, recovery is explicitly limited to pecuniary losses.47 As a
result, damages for non-pecuniary loss of society are not recoverable.48
Furthermore, the Higginbotham Court concluded that DOHSA is the
exclusive remedy for deaths on the high seas.49 Therefore, DOHSA precludes
additional claims for wrongful death under either general maritime or state
law to recover for non-pecuniary losses. As the Court stated, "when
[DOHSA] does speak directly to a question, the courts are not free to
'supplement' Congress' answer so thoroughly that the Act becomes
meaningless.
' 50
Since Moragne and Higginbotham, the Supreme Court has considered a
number of issues relating to DOHSA's exclusivity.5' Yet it has never directly
determined whether DOHSA may be supplemented with survival claims
that the law of admiralty should be expanded so that seamen are given a federal right to recover...
466 F.2d at 910.
44. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
45. Seesupra note 38.
46. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 619. Higginbotham involved a wrongful death action brought by
the widows of passengers who were killed in a helicopter crash in connection with oil drilling
operations on the high seas. Id. The widows initiated a wrongful death action which, among other
claims, sought to recover for loss of society. Id. The district court concluded that the plaintiffs could
not recover for non-pecuniary loss of society damages because DOHSA specifically limits recovery to
pecuniary losses sustained. Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 360 F. Supp. 1140, 1150 (W.D. La.
1973). The court of appeals reversed, holding that, under a Moragne rationale, plaintiff could recover
for loss of society in a supplemental wrongful death action under general maritime law. Higginbotham
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1977).
47. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 623.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 623-25. As the Court notes, DOHSA "announces Congress' considered judgment on
such issues as the beneficiaries, the limitations period, contributors negligence, survival and damages."
Id. at 625.
50. Id
51. The Court has confirmed its holding in Moragne that DOHSA does not preempt state and
general maritime actions in cases arising out of death in territorial waters. See American Export Lines,
Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274 (1980). The Court has also determined that plaintiffs may initiate
supplemental survival actions for deaths in territorial waters. Yamaha Motor Corp., v. Calhoun, 516
U.S. 199 (1996). In other cases, the Court has held that DOHSA itself limits recovery to pecuniary
damages; thus DOHSA may not be supplemented with wrongful death actions under general maritime
or state law that would afford remedies for non-pecuniary losses. See, e.g., Zicherman v. Korean Air
Lines Co., 116 S. Ct. 629, 636 (1996); Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990); Offshore
Logistics Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986).
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under state or general maritime law. In fact, in its 1996 term, the Court
expressly declined to consider this issue, as it denied certiorari in two cases
with contrary holdings.
52
However, several lower courts have addressed whether DOHSA preempts
state or general maritime survival actions. Some courts, such as the Sixth and
Ninth Circuits, have employed reasoning similar to Higginbotham, holding
that DOHSA may not be supplemented by wrongful death or survival
actions. 3 Other lower courts, including the Fourth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit,
and the District of Rhode Island, have freely allowed DOHSA to be
supplemented with survival actions under other bodies of law to provide
recovery for such non-pecuniary damages as decedent's pre-death pain and
suffering.54
Ill. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF AND IN OPPOSITION TO SUPPLEMENTING
DOHSA
The arguments in support of, and in opposition to, supplementing
DOHSA with survivorship claims under state or general maritime law are
similar in that they both rely on the same overall premises, namely that
DOHSA's plain language and legislative intent support their respective
positions.
52. See Saavedra v. Korean Air Lines Co., 93 F.3d 547 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 584
(1996); Forman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 84 F.3d 446 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 582 (1996).
When the Supreme Court denied certiorari in these cases, it left intact a split among the circuits. This
split allows litigants to engage in forum shopping, given that they will undoubtedly file suits in those
jurisdictions that permit the recovery of damages for decedent's pre-death pain and suffering in
survival actions. Interview with Andrew C. Hall, Esquire, in Miami, Fla. (Mar. 3, 1997). Furthermore,
this circuit split risks exposing airlines to varying degrees of liability depending upon the jurisdiction
in which the action is filed. This would contravene one of the Warsaw Convention's underlying goals,
to create a uniform system of recovery. See infra note 57. Accordingly, this issue must be resolved.
However, the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a case arising out of the District of
Columbia, in which the question presented is whether litigants may supplement DOHSA claims with
surviorship claims under either state or general maritime law. Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., 117
F.3d 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 66 U.S.L.W. 3324 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1998) (No. 97-704). Oral
arguments are set for sometime in April, 1998.
53. Saavedra, 93 F.3d 547; Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co., 83 F.3d 127 (6th Cir. 1996), rev'd,
96 F.3d 151 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Air Disaster Near Honolulu, Hawaii, 792 F. Supp. 1541 (N.D. Cal.
1990).
54. See Forman, 84 F.3d at 448-49 (D.C. Circuit concluded that damages for decedent's pre-
death pain and suffering are recoverable in supplemental survival actions); Azzopardi v. Ocean
Drilling & Exploration Co., 742 F.2d 890, 894 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that general maritime law can
be used to supplement DOHSA in order to provide beneficiaries with a basis for survival actions); see
also McAleer v. Smith, 791 F. Supp. 923 (D.R.I. 1992); Kuntz v. Windjammer "Barefoot" Cruises,
Ltd., 573 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. Pa. 1983); Chute v. United States, 466 F. Supp. 61 (D. Mass. 1978).
For a discussion of these post-Moragne cases, see Edward J. Balzarini, Jr., Survival Remedies For
Deaths on the High Seas, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 981 (1985).
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A. DOHSA Does not Preempt Survival Actions Under Either General
Maritime Law or State Law
In Zicherman, the Supreme Court concluded that DOHSA governs claims
filed in U.S. courts that arise under the Warsaw Convention.55 However,
many contend that DOHSA is not the exclusive remedy for actions arising
out of aviation disasters on the high seas. Rather, the Act may be
supplemented with survival actions brought under either general maritime or
state law.56 In support of this argument, claimants advance three basic
arguments: (1) because there is no clear policy to the contrary in either the
statutory language or legislative history, supplemental survival actions are
permissible; (2) to accept DOHSA as an exclusive remedy would destroy the
uniformity among signatory members to the Warsaw Convention, many of
which sanction the recovery of survival remedies; 57 and (3) to deem DOHSA
preemptive of all other sources of recovery would violate public policy.
58
55. Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 636.
56. Some who advocate supplementing DOHSA also contend that DOHSA may be
supplemented with the laws of any relevant foreign nation. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 12-14,
Saavedra v. Korean Air Lines Co., cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 584 (1996). They reason that, pursuant to
Zicherman, DOHSA is applicable to cases arising out of death on the high seas. Id. Section 764 of
DOHSA provides that "[w]henever a right of action is granted by the law of any foreign State on
account of death... such right may be maintained in an appropriate action .... 46 U.S.C. app. § 764
(1994). Applying this section, some litigants argue that survival damages are recoverable under foreign
laws, in addition to any recovery to which the parties are entitled under DOHSA, as long as the foreign
nation provides for a survival cause of action. Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., No. 96-5278, 1997 WL
380297, at *2 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Several lower court decisions lend support to this claim. See e.g. Noel
v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 260 F. Supp. 1002, 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (dual claims are permitted
under sections 762 and 764 as long as there is no double recovery); Fernandez v. Linea Aeropostal
Venezolana, 156 F. Supp. 94, 96-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (holding that plaintiffs may litigate concurrent
claims under section 761 and section 764). While this argument is not without merit, several lower
court decisions subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Zicherman have rejected it. Recently,
the Eastern District of New York (Platt, J.) determined that where a party files an action under section
762, it is precluded from initiating a similar claim under section 764. The court reasoned that
"Congress did not intend.., for parties to have access to both bases of recovery; rather, it intended to
enable parties to maintain causes of action under one of these sections." Beirn v. Korean Air Lines
Co., No. 83-4624, slip. op. at 22 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1996); Speir v. Korean Air Lines Co., No. 83-
4626, slip. op. at 22 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1996) (citing to Begeron v. K.L.M. Royal Dutch Airlines, 188
F. Supp. 594, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)). The Supreme Court has not determined whether actions under
sections 761 and 764 may be initiated concurrently.
57. Nations such as South Korea permit the recovery of survival damages. Therefore, if courts
determine that DOHSA may be supplemented with survival actions, there will be true uniformity
among Warsaw Convention members, as each nation would permit the same types of claims. Beirn,
No. 83-4624, slip. op. at 21.
58. Some urge that if DOHSA is deemed the exclusive source of recovery for aviation disasters
on the high seas, thereby precluding survival actions, persons exposed to pain and suffering prior to
their deaths will be unable to recover once they have passed away. This would lead to a substantial
reduction in recoverable damages for victims of international aviation disasters. See generally Beirn,
No. 83-4624, slip. op. at 20.
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Courts have long recognized that survival and wrongful death claims are
separate and distinct causes of action.59 Wrongfuil death actions are those
brought on behalf of the victim's family for losses they incurred as a result of
the decedent's death.6 Conversely, survival actions allow the decedent's
estate to sustain a claim for personal injury, and thereby recover those
damages to which the decedent would have been entitled had he not been
killed.61
DOHSA was enacted as a wrongful death statute.62 Further, the text itself
does not contain the word "survival. 63 Congress did not contemplate
including a provision for a survival action,64 despite the fact that it was well
aware of the distinction between the two claims.65 Therefore, it can be argued
that DOHSA was only intended to provide for a wrongful death cause of
action, and it left an intentional void with respect to survival claims incident
to deaths on the high seas.6 6 The existence of such a void meant that courts
could fashion a post-Moragne body of law recognizing survivorship claims.
Post-Moragne decisions have expanded the Supreme Court's holding and
concluded that, just as DOHSA does not address available remedies for
deaths occurring in territorial waters, it fails to discuss the applicability of
survival actions to deaths on the high seas.67 These courts conclude that
allowing survival actions under either state or general maritime law to
provide such remedies as pre-death pain and suffering "comports well with
the philosophy of Moragne, in that it remedies the non-existence of a federal
cause of action .. .' 8 Furthermore, such courts point out that allowing
59. See Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 576 (1971). See also Azzopardi, 742
F.2d at 893.
60. Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 576.
61. Id.
62. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text
63. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-767 (1988).
64. 59 CONG. REC. 4482 (1920).
65. This is evidenced by the fact that, just after enacting DOHSA, Congress promulgated the
Jones Act, which provided for both wrongful death and survival claims. For a discussion of the Jones
Act, see infra note 95 and accompanying text.
66. In McAleer v. Smith, 791 F. Supp. 923, 928 (D.R.I. 1992), the court determined that "[s]ince
DOHSA is a wrongful death statute which ... does not address survival of actions, it is entirely
appropriate that the courts should fill what would otherwise be a legislative void by allowing the ...
survival action ... to supplement DOHSA." Id. at 928-29.
67. Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794,799-800 (lst Cir. 1974).
68. Id. In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), the Supreme Court stated
that "[DOHSA] was not intended to preclude the availability of a remedy for wrongful death under
general maritime law in situations not covered by the Act." Id. at 402. The Supreme Court also
concluded that "Congress intended to ensure the continued availability of a remedy ... for deaths in
territorial waters; its failure to extend the Act to cover such deaths primarily reflected the lack of
necessity for coverage... rather than an affirmative desire to insulate such deaths from the benefits of
any federal remedy... available independently of the Act." Id. at 397-98.
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survival actions to supplement DOHSA does not conflict with DOHSA's
underlying purpose, to provide a wrongful death remedy for deaths on the
high seas.
69
Similarly, these courts have held that while DOHSA may only expressly
sanction the recovery of pecuniary damages, it does not prohibit the recovery
of non-pecuniary damages, such as pre-death pain and suffering, in
supplemental actions.70 To the contrary, any express limits on the types of
recoverable damages apply solely to wrongful death actions brought under
DOHSA, not to supplemental survival actions.7' Thus, non-pecuniary
damages are recoverable under survival actions brought concurrently with
claims under DOHSA.72
Those in favor of supplementing DOHSA also assert that to deem
DOHSA as the exclusive source of recovery for deaths on the high seas
would destroy the uniformity that the Warsaw Convention sought to create."
The Warsaw Convention was drafted in the context of civil law that, unlike
our common law system, does not distinguish between survival and wrongful
death actions.74 Consequently, many of the signatory members of the
Warsaw Convention sanction both wrongful death and survival actions.75
Furthermore, the Warsaw Convention sanctions the recovery of survival
remedies, specifically decedents' pre-death pain and suffering, in actions
arising out of international air disasters over land.76 To preclude litigants
69. Barbe, 507 F.2d at 800.
70. Id.
71. Section 762 limits recovery to "fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by
the person for whose benefit the suit is brought." 46 U.S.C. app. § 762 (1994) (emphasis added).
72. See e.g. Anderson v. Whittaker Corp., 894 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1990); Self v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co., 832 F.2d 1540, 1549-50 (1lth Cir. 1987); Law v. Sea Drilling Corp., 523 F.2d
793, 795 (5th Cir. 1975); Barbe, 507 F.2d at 799; Greene v. Vantage Steamship Corp., 466 F.2d 159,
166 (4th Cir. 1972); Spiller v. Thomas M. Lowe, Jr. & Assocs., Inc., 466 F.2d 903, 909-10 (8th Cir.
1972); Gray v. Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Co., 880 F. Supp. 1559, 1570 (N.D. Ga. 1995); Rye v.
United States Steel Mining Co., Inc., 856 F. Supp. 274, 280 (E.D. Va. 1994); Newhouse v. United
States, 884 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Nev. 1994); McAleer v. Smith, 791 F. Supp. 923, 926 (D.R.I. 1992).
While some litigants have urged that remedies for non-pecuniary losses are directly recoverable under
DOHSA, their claim is without merit. The Sixth Circuit recently rejected this contention when it
determined that, in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Zicherman v. Korean Airlines Co., 116 S.
Ct. 629 (1996), "there is no serious doubt that DOHSA itself does not provide for such a form of
damages." Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co., 83 F.3d 127, 132 (6th Cir.), rev'd, 96 F.3d 151 (6th Cir.
1996).
73. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 28.
75. Stephen J. Fearon, Recoverable Damages in Wrongul Death Actions Governed By the
Warsaw Convention, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 367, 375 (1995). See also supra note 57.
76. Fearon, supra note 75, citing In re Inflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines, 778 F. Supp.
625, 636-41 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (court determined that decedent's beneficiaries may recover for pre-
death pain and suffering if they are able to satisfy the following standard by a preponderance of the
evidence: they must prove that the victim survived the initial injury and that he was conscious
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from initiating survival actions in U.S. courts merely because the disaster
occurred on the high seas would destroy the Convention's goal of
uniformity.77 Thus, DOHSA should not preempt all other sources of
recovery.
Perhaps the most compelling argument in support of supplementing
DOHSA is that any decision to the contrary violates public policy.78 In
determining that wrongful death claims are the sole remedy afforded under
DOHSA, courts would effectively prohibit remedies for pain and suffering to
which the decedent would have been entitled had he lived.7 9 Furthermore,
recovery available to victims' beneficiaries would be very limited, given that
the Warsaw Convention already imposes a damage cap for actions arising
thereunder.80 As Justice Chase once stated, "[c]ertainly it better becomes the
humane and liberal character of proceedings in admiralty to give than
withhold the remedy, when not required to withhold it by established and
inflexible rules.'A
l
B. DOHSA Is the Exclusive Remedial Basis for Deaths on the High Seas
Courts such as the Sixth and Ninth Circuits do not permit DOHSA to be
following the initial injury and suffered at the time).
77. Smith, Jr., supra note 33, at 197-98. However, the Supreme Court has held that although
it was a primary function of the Warsaw Convention to foster uniformity in the law of
international air travel... this is not an area in which the imposition of uniformity was found
feasible. [citations omitted] The Convention neither adopted any uniform rule of its own nor
authorized national courts to pursue uniformity in derogation of otherwise applicable law.
Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 636 (citations omitted).
78. See generally Colella, supra note 15.
79. Hollie v. Korean Air Lines Co., 60 F.3d 90,93 (2d Cir. 1995). The following are conclusions
regarding the level of pre-death pain and suffering incurred by passengers aboard Korean Air Lines
Flight 007 after listening to the flight data recorder
[Trhe passengers ... most certainly heard the missiles strike, heard the explosive sounds of
decompression .... mhey were aware of the plane zooming ... out of control, and of the rapid
descent ... of the rolls which culminated in the Dutch roll, and spirals, and of at least the entire
nine minutes during which they were [descending].
Donald R. Andersen, Recent Cases and Developments in Aviation Law, 60 J. AIR L. & CoMM. 3
(1994). However, the contrary argument is that "[m]aritime tort law is now dominated by federal
statute, and we are not free to expand remedies at will simply because it might work to the benefit of
[those killed on the high seas] and those dependent upon them." Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S.
19, 36 (1990).
80. This argument is premised on the fact that the Warsaw Convention, and the amended version
thereof contained in the Montreal Agreement, imposed a $75,000 damage cap on recovery. William C.
Brown, IlI, supra note 21, at 591. However, the persuasiveness of this argument is minimized given
that the damage cap has been raised. Furthermore, numerous international air carriers have voluntarily
agreed to waive any applicable damage caps. See infra note 122.
81. The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909, 910 (CC Md. 1865) (No. 12,578) (quoted in Mobile Oil Corp.
v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 629-30) (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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supplemented with survival claims for decedents' pre-death pain and
suffering in actions arising out of international air disasters over the high
seas.8 2 These courts reason that, because DOHSA is the sole basis on which
remedies are awarded, it preempts actions under either state or general
maritime law. Their conclusions are grounded on essentially two overall
premises.8 3 First, DOHSA limits sustainable causes of action to those for
wrongful death.84 Additionally, DOHSA specifically provides that recovery
shall be limited to remedies for pecuniary loss. 85 Therefore pre-death pain
and suffering damages are not recoverable under either DOHSA or a
supplemental action because they are non-pecuniary. To support both of
these conclusions, proponents of DOHSA's exclusivity rely on plain
language, legislative history and intent, and a desire to provide for uniform
recovery in actions filed in U.S. courts.
Advocates of DOHSA's exclusivity assert that the statute's plain
language explicitly restricts DOHSA to wrongful death claims.86 Section 762
states that recovery "shall be for the pecuniary loss sustained by the persons
for whose benefit the suit is brought and shall be apportioned... by the court
in proportion to the loss they may severally have suffered by reason of the
death of the person by whose representative the suit is brought." 87 In
addition, the word "survival" does not appear in the text of the statute, nor is
there any implicit reference thereto.88
Moreover, to supplement DOHSA with survival actions under either
general maritime or state law would require courts to ignore Congressional
intent DOHSA was enacted to provide a basis for wrongful death claims in
matters arising out of death on the high seas.89 Had Congress intended
survival actions under state or general maritime law to supplement DOHSA,
it would have so indicated in either the language of the statute or in the
legislative history preceding its enactment. The absence of any reference to
82. See supra notes 52-53.
83. Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee Korean Air Lines, Saavedra v.
Korean Air Lines Co., 93 F.3d 547 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 584 (1996).
84. Id.
85. Id.; see also supra note 19.
86. For example, in Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 237 (1986) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), Justice Powell cites the lower court opinion for Congress'
intent. The court of appeals judge noted that, "[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the
contrary, the plain words of the statute must ordinarily be regarded as controlling." Id. at 237.
87. 46 U.S.C. app. § 762 (1994).
88. Id.
89. This is evidenced by the fact that DOHSA was enacted in response to The Harrisburg, 119
U.S. 199 (1886), in which the Supreme Court declined to recognize a federal wrongful death cause of
action. In addition, Congress modeled DOHSA after Lord Campell's Act, which solely created this
wrongful death cause of action. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
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survival actions in either of these sources is significant because it
demonstrates that Congress did not intend to provide such damages in
DOHSA actions.
90
At the time of DOHSA's enactment, Congress was well aware of the
distinction between wrongful death and survival actions.91 For example, a
few weeks after passing DOHSA, Congress ratified the Jones Act, 92 which
expressly permitted both wrongful death and survival causes of action.93 In
contrast, DOHSA only specifically sanctions wrongful death actions.94 The
inference is that Congress omitted any reference to survival claims from
DOHSA because it did not want survival actions to arise out of deaths on the
high seas. Thus, to supplement DOHSA with survival actions under other
bodies of law would run contrary to Congressional intent.95
90. Opponents of this view rely on the Supreme Court's holding in Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1990), to show that DOHSA was not intended to be preemptive of other
causes of action and therefore may be supplemented with survival actions under other bodies of law.
See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text. Their reliance on Moragne is misplaced, however.
First, Moragne dealt with an action for wrongful death occurring not on the high seas, but in territorial
waters, a situation to which DOHSA is not even applicable. Had the Court not supplemented DOHSA
in this case, plaintiff would not have been able to recover for her losses stemming from defendant's
unseaworthiness. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 375. Thus, there was a legislative void with respect to
recoverable remedies for deaths occurring in territorial waters. In the case of deaths occurring on the
high seas, there is no such void because Congress has specifically provided remedies for deaths on the
high seas, namely, a wrongful death action under DOHSA. Furthermore, although the Moragne Court
allowed an additional claim to run concurrently with the DOHSA claim, it only sanctioned a
supplemental wrongful death action under general maritime law. Id. To supplement DOHSA with a
survival action would be wholly inconsistent with Congress' intent underlying the Act, and would
allow a court to circumvent any legislation that it deemed unfair or imprudent. As the Supreme Court
stated in Mobile Oil corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978), "[t]here is a basic difference
between filling a gap left by Congress' silence and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and
specifically enacted."
91. Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 214-16. See also Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990)
("[w]e assume that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation").
92. 46U.S.C. app. § 688 (1994).
93. For a thorough discussion of the Jones Act, see Richard A. Givens, MANUAL OF FEDERAL
PRACTICE, § 1.90 (4th ed. 1987); see also Moris Davidovitz, Aviation Deaths on the High Seas: The
Flight into Maritime Law, 10 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 57, 70-71 (1986); Smith, supra note
33, at 186; see also Miles, 498 U.S. at 32-34.
94. 46 U.S.C. app. § 761 (1988).
95. Opponents of this view indicate that the distinction between the Jones Act and DOHSA is not
decisive given that both of these enactments were passed hurriedly and thus were not drafted carefully.
They reason that the presence of a survival provision in the Jones Act, and the absence thereof in
DOHSA, was "probably unintentional" and was due simply to the poor drafting of each statute.
McAleer v. Smith, 791 F. Supp. 923, 928 (D.R.I. 1992). Moreover, in American Export Lines, Inc. v.
Alvez, 446 U.S. 274 (1980), the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he Jones Act itself was not the product
of careful drafting or attentive legislative review.... Thus, a remedial omission in the Jones Act is not
evidence of considered congressional policymaking that should command our adherence in analogous
contexts." Id. at 283 (citations omitted). But this argument fails to consider the fact that another
version of DOHSA was proposed and brought before Congress a number of years before the current
statute was enacted. This suggests that Congress did not ratify this legislation in a hurried fashion, but
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The history of cases under the Federal Employers Liability Act
(TELA") 96 serves as further proof that DOHSA was intended to provide
exclusively for wrongful death actions in cases arising out of deaths on the
high seas.97 In its original form, FELA permitted only wrongful death
claims.98 In Michigan Cent. R.R Co. v. Vreeland,99 the Supreme Court held
that survival actions could not be sustained in FELA claims because they
were not specifically provided for in the statute's plain language. 00
Moreover, the Court determined that FELA was preemptive of all state and
local regulations on the same subject; thus, it could not be supplemented with
survival claims under other bodies of law.10' Congress later amended FELA
to include a survivorship action. 0 2 Only then did the Supreme Court
recognize survival claims because the amended "provision expresses the
deliberate will of Congress."'
10 3
Another justification in support of DOHSA's exclusivity is that section
762 of DOHSA specifically limits recovery to pecuniary losses.104 Decisions
that permit non-pecuniary relief in DOHSA claims nullify the statute's plain
language and circumvent Congressional intent Therefore, it logically follows
that non-pecuniary damages, specifically those for pre-death pain and
suffering, are not recoverable under the statute. 05 Recent decisions have
upheld this restriction in the context of other non-pecuniary damages. 06
rather was careful in determining the precise language that would be contained therein. See supra note
16 and accompanying text.
96. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994).
97. 45 U.S.C. § 59 (1994).
98. Miles, 498 U.S. at 32-34. FELA was first enacted on April 22, 1908. Like DOHSA, it was
modeled after Lord Campbell's Act. Id. at 32 (citing to Michigan Cent. R.R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S.
59 (1913)).
99. Michigan Cent. R.R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913).
100. Vreeland, 227 U.S. at 59. In denying the right to initiate survival claims under FELA, the
Court concluded that "[t]he act of 1908 does not provide for any survival of the right of action created
in behalf of an injured employee." Id. at 67-68. Justice Lurton determined that his strict construction of
FELA was supported by Congressional intent in enacting the legislation. Justice Lorton determined
that, in enacting FELA, Congress intended to provide recovery to the families of those employees
killed "for the loss and damage resulting to them financially by reason of the wrongful death." Id. at
68.
101. Id. at 66-69; see also St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648, 656
(1915) (Supreme Court held that FELA could not be supplemented with a survival action under state
law). After these decisions, Congress modified FELA on April 5, 1910, to include Section 9, which
provided that an injured employee's cause of action survives him. Id. at 657.
102. Craft, 237 U.S. at 657.
103. Id. at 658.
104. 46 U.S.C. app. § 762 (1994); see also supra note 19.
105. See Supplemental Brief on Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Korean Air Lines Co., at 3,
Saavedra v. Korean Air Lines Co., 93 F.3d 547 (9th Cir.), cert. denied., 117 S. Ct. 584 (1996).
106. See Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 232 (1986) ("survivors should be
restricted to the recovery of their pecuniary losses .... ); Mobile Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S.
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Specifically, in Zicherman, the Supreme Court denied recovery of non-
pecuniary damages to victims' survivors. 107 The Court held that where
DOHSA applies, it may not be supplemented with actions brought under
other bodies of law in order to provide for the recovery of non-pecuniary
damages. 108
To permit recovery for non-pecuniary losses in actions arising out of
international aviation disasters occurring on the high seas would run contrary
to Congressional intent. In enacting DOHSA, Congress expressly limited
recovery to pecuniary losses sustained.10 9 Where, as here, Congress has
618, 625 (1978) (holding that loss of society damages are not recoverable under DOHSA and that
DOHSA may not be supplemented with general maritime law); see also Bickel v. Korean Air Lines
Co., 83 F.3d 127, 131-32 (6th Cir.) (the court precluded recovery damages for of loss of society,
survivor's grief and pre-death pain and suffering on grounds that such are non-pecuniary losses and are
therefore not recoverable under DOHSA); rev'd, 96 F.3d 151 (6th Cir. 1996); Bergen v. FN St.
Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345, 1348 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that punitive damages are non-pecuniary and are
therefore not recoverable under DOHSA); In re Air Disaster Near Honolulu, Hawaii, 792 F. Supp.
1541, 1544-45 (N.D. Cal. 1990). In In re Air Disaster Near Honolulu, Hawaii, the court held that non-
pecuniary damages may not be recovered in any action under DOHSA. Id. The court also concluded
that DOHSA may not be preempted or supplemented. Id. at 1546. This decision was eventually
overturned, and non-pecuniary damages were permitted, on the grounds that such are sanctioned by
the Warsaw Convention. Id. However, this decision was rendered prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 116 S. Ct. 629 (1996), in which the Court determined
that the Warsaw Convention does not determine the nature of recoverable damages. Id. at 636. See
also supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
107. Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 636. In Zicherman, the Supreme Court recognized that DOHSA
expressly limits recovery to pecuniary losses sustained. Therefore, the Court precluded plaintiffs from
recovering for loss of society, either under DOHSA or in a supplemental wrongful death action,
because such damages are non-pecuniary. While the Zicherman holding was limited to loss of society
damages, it necessarily follows from the language of the opinion that the recovery of any non-
pecuniary loss, including decedent's pre-death pain and suffering, is prohibited in both DOHSA
actions and in supplemental survival claims under state or general maritime law. Opponents of this
view argue that the Zicherman Court in fact upheld the recovery of decedent's pre-death pain and
suffering in a supplemental survival action. Therefore, opponents urge that Zicherman cannot be relied
upon as an indication of DOHSA's preemptive nature. Beim v. Korean Air Lines Co., No. 83-4624,
slip. op. at 11-12 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1996). "[To interpret any language in the Zicherman opinion as
limiting a plaintiff's remedy... to wrongful death may ... be an improper expansion of that case's
holding." Id. However, this contention is not a proper interpretation of the Court's holding. The
Second Circuit in Zicherman allowed the recovery of pre-death pain and suffering damages in
supplemental survival actions. Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 43 F.3d 18, 23 (2d Cir. 1996). In
its petition for certiorari, Korean Air Lines failed to raise this award on appeal. Therefore, the Supreme
Court expressly declined to address the issue of DOHSA's preemption of supplemental survival
actions. Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 636 n.4. Yet some lower courts have concluded that, because the
issue of recoverability of damages for pain and suffering in supplemental actions was never appealed,
this issue is not subject to further review under the doctrines of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion.
See Beirn, No. 83-4624, slip. op. at 20. Therefore, they conclude that damages for pain and suffering
are recoverable in supplemental survival claims. Id
108. Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 636. The Court held that "where DOHSA applies, neither state law,
nor general maritime law, can provide a basis for recovery of loss-of-society damages." Id. (citations
omitted).
109. In section 762, Congress provided that recovery is to be limited to "a fair and just
1351
Washington University Open Scholarship
1352 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 75:1335
specifically addressed an issue within the language of a statute, courts are not
free to interpret the statute in a way that ignores Congress' intent.
110
The availability of a supplemental survival cause of action in cases to
which DOHSA applies threatens the Warsaw Convention's goal of
uniformity. 1 ' If DOHSA were supplemented by survival actions under state
or general maritime law, air carriers could be forced to defend fifty separate
actions in the U.S. alone.' 12 As Moragne itself implied, "DOHSA should be
the courts' primary guide as they refine the nonstatutory death remedy ...
because of the interest in uniformity...
IV. RECENT DECISIONS ON THIS ISSUE
Recently, several lower courts have addressed the issue of DOHSA's
exclusivity in detail. These decisions are noteworthy because they are among
the first to have specifically considered the recoverability of damages for
decedents' pre-death pain and suffering.
D.C. Circuit
In Forman v. Korean Air Lines Co., the D.C. Circuit upheld the plaintiff's
recovery for damages for pre-death pain and suffering. 114 The court
concluded that there was sufficient evidence to indicate that the decedent
compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained." 46 U.S.C. app. § 762 (1994). In describing
recoverable damages under DOHSA in such a manner, Congress indicated that recovery for pecuniary
losses is equitable; thus implying recovery of non-pecuniary losses is not necessary.
110. Seesupra note 90.
111. See Bickel, 83 F.3d at 130 ("The Warsaw Convention, however, embodies a concrete policy
of uniformity and certainty, which would be undermined by the use of state choice of law rules.")
(citations omitted).
112. Luis F. Ras, Warsaw's Wingspan Over State Laws: Towards a Streamlined System of
Recovery, 59 J. AIRL. & COMM. 587, 603-04 (1994) (citing to In re Air Crash at Lockerbie, Scotland,
928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1991)); see also Velazquez v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 747 F.
Supp. 670, 676 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
113. Mobile Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 624 (1978).
114. 84 F.3d 446 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 582 (1996). In Forman, Korean Air Lines
argued that the award for pre-death pain and suffering in supplemental survival actions should be
reversed in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Zicherman. Id. at 448. However, Korean Air Lines
failed to raise this contention in its briefing papers, given that Zicherman was decided after the reply
papers were filed. Id. The D.C. Circuit refused to allow Korean Air Lines to amend its reply papers,
and therefore upheld the lower court's award for pre-death pain and suffering. The court concluded
that, while Zicherman had not yet been decided, counsel for Korean Air Lines could have included the
arguments presented in Zicherman in its papers, particularly given that counsel argued Zicherman
before the Supreme Court. Id. While the D.C. Circuit did uphold the lower court's award of damages
for pre-death pain and suffering in supplemental survival actions, it specifically declined to decide
whether such damages would be available in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Zicherman. Id.
at 448-49.
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survived the initial missile strike on KAL Flight 007 and that she was
conscious throughout most of the plane's descent
1 15
Sixth Circuit
Conversely, in Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co., the Sixth Circuit held that
non-pecuniary losses for decedents' pre-death pain and suffering are not
recoverable. 16 Furthermore, it held that DOHSA was exclusive and may not
be supplemented.'17
Ninth Circuit
In Saavedra v. Korean Air Lines Co., the Ninth Circuit agreed with the
Sixth Circuit's view that DOHSA is preemptive; thus, the court refused to
supplement DOHSA with survival actions under general maritime or state
law."' The court concluded that Higginbotham and Zicherman preclude
recovery of non-pecuniary damages, either under DOHSA or under a
supplemental claim."l 9
V. PROPOSAL
When the Supreme Court revisits this issue later this term, it should
conclude that DOHSA is the sole source of recovery for actions arising out of
international air disasters on the high seas.
DOHSA was enacted to provide a wrongful death remedy for deaths on
the high seas120 Had Congress intended to allow litigants to bring survival
actions concurrently with DOHSA claims, it most certainly would have
included a survival provision within the statute. This contention is supported
by analyzing the history of FELA, in which the Supreme Court recognized a
survival action only after Congress amended the original version to include
115. Id. at 449.
116. 83 F.3d 127 (6th Cir.), rev'd, 96 F.3d 151 (6th Cir. 1996).
117. This decision was later reversed by the same court in Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co., 96 F.3d
151 (6th Cir. 1996). However, it was overturned on grounds that the Sixth Circuit should not have
addressed the exclusivity of DOHSA in its first decision because Korean Air Lines failed to raise it on
appeal. Id. Because the initial Sixth Circuit opinion precluding survival claims was reversed on
procedural grounds, the subsequent decision should not be relied on as an indication that the Court
would now permit DOHSA to be supplemented.
118. Saavedra v. Korean Air Lines Co., 93 F.3d 547, 553-54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
584 (1996).
119. Id.at 553.
120. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
1353
Washington University Open Scholarship
1354 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 75:1335
such a remedy.121 Similarly, because DOHSA does not include a survival
clause, it may not be supplemented with survival actions under either state or
general maritime law. Therefore, the Supreme Court must hold that DOHSA
is the exclusive basis for actions involving international air disasters on the
high seas.
While this result is appropriate given the current status of the law, it is by
no means the preferable one. If the Supreme Court were to conclude that
DOHSA is preemptive, it would effectively extinguish numerous claims for
pre-death pain and suffering currently being litigated in U.S. courts.
Additionally, it would leave victims of international aviation disasters
without adequate compensation, given the limited liability to which air
carriers are exposed under the Warsaw Convention. 122 Because of such
inequity, coupled with the impracticality of supplementing DOHSA with
actions under state or general maritime law, Congress must amend the law in
one of two ways.123
On the one hand, Congress could amend DOHSA to provide for survival
claims in actions for death on the high seas. Under this plan, Congress would
have to modify section 761 to allow the decedent's estate to sustain an action
121. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
122. Indicating the existence of inadequate recovery levels, the Department of Transportation
recently approved a measure which raised the amount to which air carriers may be liable under the
Warsaw Convention to about $140,000. US Approves IATA Pacts on Passenger Liability, BUSINESS
TIMES, Jan. 17, 1997, at 2, available in 1997 WL 2963703. Recently, however, the International Air
Transport Association ("IATA") has released an agreement whereby signatory members of the
Warsaw Convention will not apply any liability limits set forth in the Convention to actions arising out
of international aviation disasters. Id. This agreement was approved by the U.S. Department of
Transportation. Id. Consequently, DOHSA victims' families could ostensibly recover an unlimited
amount of damages through wrongful death claims when a loved one is killed. While this may
alleviate some of the injustice that would accompany a determination of DOHSA's exclusivity, it
would by no means remedy the situation completely. Decedents would still not be entitled to recover
from what could potentially be months of pain and suffering prior to their deaths.
123. Some practitioners suggest that, rather than amend DOHSA or replace it with other
legislation, Congress should withdraw from the Warsaw Convention altogether. Interview with
Andrew C. Hall, Esquire, in Miami, Fla. (Mar. 3, 1997). They argue that the Warsaw Convention is
merely an outdated, unfair treaty promulgated as a result of pressures from the airline industry which
sought to limit its liability, regardless of the deleterious impact this would have on passengers.
Specifically, air carriers sought protection against punitive damage awards, which are not permitted in
suits arising under the Warsaw Convention, no matter how egregious their conduct may have been.
Accordingly, these practitioners urge that aviation disasters should be governed by tort law, such that
victims of air disasters would be able to attain whatever common law and statutory awards afforded by
the jurisdiction in which they file suit. Id. This would include both wrongful death remedies, survival
damages, and punitive damages, where applicable. Id. See also Dateline NBC (NBC television
broadcast, Oct. 13, 1996). "The Warsaw Convention was drafted in 1929, two years after Charles
Lindbergh made the first nonstop flight from New York to Paris." Id. (statement by Lee Creindler)
"Who could argue that [the Warsaw Convention] was justified then, but to stay with this principle of
limited liability through 1996 is insane, utterly insane." Id. (statement by Jack Ford).
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on his or her behalf. Congress must also amend section 762 to include the
following clause:
Furthermore, if an action is brought on behalf of a decedent's estate
for losses sustained prior to his death, recovery shall be limited to a
fair and just compensation for those losses sustained.
In the alternative, Congress could enact new legislation to govern all
international air disasters, rather than apply DOHSA to such claims.' 24
DOHSA was enacted at a time when commercial aviation was not as
widespread as it is today; thus, it is ill equipped to handle the complex issues
that arise out of aviation litigation. Accordingly, DOHSA should be replaced.
The new legislation would be aimed specifically at claims arising under
the Warsaw Convention. It would apply to all international air disasters,
regardless of whether they occur on land or over seas.1 25 The statute would
grant exclusive jurisdiction over international aviation disasters to the federal
courts.' 26 It would emulate the domestic laws of such foreign nations as
England, Canada, and Germany, each of which have adopted legislation
specifically directed at international aviation litigation.
127
124. Congress is currently considering a bill that would deny DOHSA's application to aviation
disasters. This legislation, first proposed by Representative McDade of Pennsylvania, amends DOHSA
by providing that the statute is restricted to "actions for death on the high seas and other navigable
waters." H.R. 2005, 105th Cong. § 1 (1997). This bill passed in the House on July 30, 1997. Id. It was
introduced in the Senate by Senator Specter of Pennsylvania as Senate bill 943. See S. 943, 105th
Cong. § 1 (1997). The Senate is set to vote on this bill during the second session of the 105th
Congress.
If enacted, this legislation would cause any action arising out of aviation disasters to be governed
by state tort law. In doing so, the law would enable litigants to recover both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary damages in wrongful death and survivorship actions. While this law would allow for more
equitable recovery, the manner in which it achieves this result creates the potential for gross
inconsistencies in recovery. Those litigants who initiate their claims in one state may recover far less
than others who bring claims in different states given differences in state tort law, even though
litigants' actions may arise out of the same aviation disaster. Furthermore, this legislation potentially
would subject air carriers to individual suits in 50 different states. Therefore, rather than amend
DOHSA, Congress should take the time to enact legislation applicable solely to claims arising under
the Warsaw Convention. See infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
125. Id. (statement by Jack Ford)
There's another set of arcane rules called [DOHSA], applying to crashes in international waters.
Awards are again limited, this time to economic losses only. That means that the amount of
money the victims might have provided for their survivors. And where do international waters
begin? Some lawyers say it's three miles offthe U.S. shore, others say 12 miles.
Id. Consequently, the current standard could be totally different, depending upon where the crash
occurred. Id.
126. This section is modeled after the Senate Bill 3305, proposed in 1968 by Senator Tydings.
Albert Lin, Jurisdictional Splashdown: Should Aviation Torts Find Solace in Admiralty?, 60 J. AIR L.
& COMM. 409,437 (1994).
127. England ratified the Carriage by Air Act of 1932, which was later replaced by the Carriage
by Air Act of 1961. P.P.C. Haanappel, The Right to Sue in Death Cases Under the Warsaw
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While the proposed legislation must be comprehensive, only the relevant
portions will be drafted for the purposes of this Note:
Clause 1: All claims arising out of international aviation disasters will
be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Clause 2: In claims arising out of such incidents, claims may be
brought either on behalf of the decedents' direct beneficiaries
(wrongful death claims), or on behalf of the decedents' estate (survival
actions).
Clause 4: Recoverable damages shall include those for pecuniary and
non-pecuniary losses sustained. Punitive damages may not be
recovered under this section.
Clause 5: Damage awards are limited to the amount set forth by the
Department of Transportation. 128 However, air carriers are free to
engage in any international agreement to waive this damage limit.
129
CONCLUSION
The current practice of supplementing DOHSA in some jurisdictions,
while deeming it exclusive in others, must be changed. A uniform system of
recovery must be established for actions arising out of international air
disasters. This must be accomplished by Congress, not the judiciary.
However, until the legislature acts, courts must conclude that DOHSA
preempts all other sources of recovery.
Kathryn A. Meyers
Convention, 6 AIR LAW 66, 72-73 (1981). Canada enacted the Carriage by Air Act in 1947, which
applies specifically to causes of action under the Warsaw Convention. This legislation allows victims'
dependents to recover in wrongful death actions. Id. at 70. Similarly, the German Air Traffic Act
allows for recovery by any person to whom the decedent was liable for support Id. at 74-75. While the
model statute contained in this Note resembles those of England, Canada, and Germany, it differs in
that this statute expressly contains a survival clause.
128. See supra note 122.
129. See supra note 123.
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